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Executive Summary
In countries like Spain, and particularly in its Mediterranean coast, there is a high degree
of public awareness of the main consequences of the scarcity of water and the need of
fostering efficient use of water resources. Two new mechanisms for water management
already under way are: a heated debate on the need and feasibility of transferring water
from one basin to another, and, directly related to this proposal, the regulation of water
banks.1
It has been sufficiently argued that more efficient uses of water may be achieved within
an institutional framework where water rights may be exchanged more freely, not only un-
der exceptional conditions but on a day to day basis [Cal06, RGL04, Tho97]. It has been
claimed that if farmers cannot sell their extra water allotment, they have no incentive to
use the allotment efficiently and it may become wasteful [HR07]. Moreover, a straightfor-
ward extension to other types of stakeholders would promote trading for industrial uses,
aquiculture, leisure or navigation, not only irrigation, thus improving market conditions
and hence efficiency of water use [Cal06]. We propose to implement such a market with a
regulated open multi-agent system, mWater, whose main features we discuss in this paper.
Our focus is on demand and, in particular, on the type of regulatory and market mech-
anisms that foster an efficient use of water while preventing conflicts.2 We are therefore
interested in the institutional framework that defines the “rules of the game” that may al-
low one to study the role that regulation, social environment, coordination, conflict reso-
lution mechanisms, reputation or trust play in the decisions participating agents make and
their aggregate results. Ideally, the institutional framework should add flexibility to cur-
1The 2001 Water Law of the National Hidrological Plan (NHP) —’Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2001,
BOE 176’ (see www.boe.es/boe/dias/2001/07/24/pdfs/A26791-26817.pdf, in Spanish)— and its amend-
ment in 2005 regulates the power of right-holders to engage in voluntary water transfers, and of basin
authorities to setup water markets, banks, and trading centers for the exchange of water rights in cases of
drought or other severe scarcity problems.
2Considerable effort has been invested in the development of sophisticated basin simulation models and
in improvement and innovation of water use practices. Literature abounds in examples of decision support
systems for water management [RN05], sustainable planning of water volumes [CLM04, MdSODO+07],
or the use of shared visions for negotiation and conflict resolution [PWMW99]. We explore an alterna-
tive approach in which individual and collective agents are an essential component because their behavior
(and effects) may be influenced by policy-making. There are few projects along this line but one may
point to the NEGOWAT project (http://www.negowat.org/ingles/inicio/Inicio.htm), whose goal is to help
negotiations between stakeholders in peri-urban catchment areas when water conflicts arise. Closer to our
own approach, the recent effort is project MAELIA (http://www.iaai-maelia.eu), that involves simulation of
socio-environmental impact of norms for water and other renewable natural resources and the environment.
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rent water use practices without increasing the number or complexity of disputes. In such
a framework we shall profit from agreement technologies to understand the behaviour of
participating agents and the collective effects of their behavior.
As a whole, mWater constitutes a rather complex regulated open multi-agent system.
The work we report in this deliverable provides the prototype review. This report includes
the results from the mWater Advisory Board review report from the mid 2010 meeting in
Valencia.
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A decission support tool for
Water-Right Markets
Water scarcity is becoming a major concern in most countries, not only because it threat-
ens the economic viability of current agricultural practices, but because it is likely to alter
an already precarious balance among its different types of use. Underneath this emer-
gent situation, the crude reality of conflicts over water rights and the need of accurate
assessment of water needs become more salient than ever.
It has been sufficiently argued that more efficient uses of water may be achieved within
an institutional framework where water rights may be exchanged more freely, not only
under exceptional conditions but on a day-to-day basis [Tho97], similarly to a traditional
goods market. In hydrological terms, a water market can be defined as an institutional,
decentralized framework where users with water rights (right holders) are allowed to vol-
untarily trade them, always fulfilling some pre-established norms, to other users in ex-
change of some compensation, economic or not [Tho97]. Additionally, when there exist
incentives for an efficient use of water allotment, it is time for a straightforward exten-
sion to other types of stakeholders that promote trading for non-irrigation uses, such as
industrial uses, aquiculture or leisure, thus improving market conditions and efficiency in
water use. This paper concerns the application of a regulated open Multi-Agent System
(MAS), mWater, that uses intelligent agents to simulate a flexible water-right market. Our
simulator focuses on demands and, in particular, on the type of regulatory (in terms of
norms selection and agents behaviour), and market mechanisms that foster an efficient
use of water while also trying to prevent conflicts among parties. In this scenario, a MAS
plays a vital role as it allows us to define different norms, agents behaviour and roles,
and assess their impact in the market, thus enhancing the quality and applicability of its
results as a decision support tool.
1
1. A DECISSION SUPPORT TOOL FOR WATER-RIGHT MARKETS
1.1 Problem Overview and its Current Limitations
Water-right markets allow rapid changes in allocation in response to changing demands
for water and stimulate investment and employment, as users are assured of access to
secure supplies of water. Because of water’s unique characteristics, such markets do not
work everywhere, they are not homogenous as present different organisation schemata,
nor do they solve all water-related issues [Tho97]. So it is essential to design appropriate
water laws and regulate, either privately or publicly, the users’ actions, interactions and
their eventual trade.
The willingness of irrigators to buy or sell water initially depends on the difference
between the price of water and net revenue each farmer expects to earn by irrigating.
Thus, for a given price of irrigation water, a farmer would be willing to purchase water
if (s)he expects a unit of water to generate more incomes than it costs. If another farmer
expects a unit of water to earn less that (s)he could sell it for, (s)he might want to sell it
thus originating the trading process. But it is not always a matter of price expectations,
but also of regulation. The emphasis on regulatory aspects is motivated by the fact that the
main objective policy makers have in mind is to achieve an adequate behaviour of users
to ensure the success of the market. And regulation is the main tool that policy makers
have to modify behaviour by means of laws, local and social norms. In practice, users
are prone to achieve “order without law” or, at least, to preserve their practices within
the established regulation, whereas policy makers adapt regulation to guide users in a
constantly changing environmental and political media. Also, as the result of enforcing
norms in a water market is unknown a priori, a MAS-based simulation tool shows very
appealing to analyse the impact in the users, the market itself and its success.
Literature abounds in examples of sophisticated basin simulation models, particularly
decision support systems for water management [ACS96, RN05], sustainable planning
of water volumes and hydraulic resources [CLM04, MdSODO+07], and use of shared
visions for negotiation and conflict resolution [PWMW99, SHS09]. From a hydrological
perspective, these works have successfully bridged the gap between the state of the art
in water-resource systems analysis and the usage by practitioners at the real-world level.
Clearly, operational management has benefited from the advances in computing and its
applications, particularly in modelling, software engineering and simulation techniques,
thus helping improve the operating rules for efficient water allocation. However, the gap
can still be considerably narrowed from a social perspective, which is an important limita-
tion nowadays. The underlying idea is not only to consider hydraulic factors, such as river
basins, water demands, pumping flows, etc., but also different norms typology, human
(mis)conducts, trust criteria and users willingness to agree on water-right trading, which
may lead to a win-win situation in a more efficient use of water. This requires the use of
intelligent agent technology, including trust, cooperation, argumentation and, in general,
agreement technologies (see http://www.agreement-technologies.org). Agree-
ment is a crucial concept that helps human agents to cope with their social environment
and deal with any type of human interactions. And how to support and promote agree-
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ments in water markets is missing in current approaches, which is also an indication of
ineffectiveness.
An additional limitation is imposed by current legislation. In many countries, the
norms and their regulation are very strict, which do not allow a full and flexible market.
For instance, Spanish regulation is too restrictive; the Water Law of the National Hydro-
logical Plan regulates the power of right holders to engage in voluntary water transfers,
and of basin authorities to setup water markets, banks and trading centers for the exchange
of water rights, but only in cases of drought or other severe scarcity problems. This means
that the number of water-right transfers is practically nonexistent in reality, and limited to
very short periods. Also, in some tentative scenarios aimed at forming water markets the
results were unsatisfactory because: i) water-right holders were reluctant to participate in
the market, and ii) regulation and legally binding conditions were too strong.
Finally, from a performance standpoint it is unclear which is the best quality indica-
tor of the market because it cannot be measured in terms of just one factor; we need a
multiobjective analysis that comprises multiple criteria based on differing objectives, re-
sponsibilities and interests among the stakeholders and institutions involved in the market.
Factors such as economic development, social welfare, environment preservation, agricul-
tural self-sufficiency and financial feasibility must be considered. All in all, these issues
can be achieved at a high global cost which is based on industry structure, population,
quality standards, investment for new treatment plants, and policy for water allocation
among agriculture, industry and domestic sectors.
In this paper, the simulation tool provides the foundations for the study of that inter-
play among agents, rule enforcing and performance indicators. In particular, we simulate
and test how regulations and norms modify the users’ behaviour and how it affects the
quality of the market.
1.2 Why Use a MAS as a Simulation Tool?
Agent technology and multi-agent systems have been successfully applied to problems
such as manufacturing, medicine, aero-space, etc. One of the most promising domain
applications of MASs is the simulation of complex real life systems that emulate social
behaviour and organizations, where a MAS is used as a powerful tool that mimics real
world behaviours of individuals and societies [SHS09, SJR+02, GB04a, JB04, GB04b,
AGV+04, GB06, APA+07, BJC+06, HGPRG+09, GV09, GJR+10]. In this way, com-
plex behavioural patterns are observed from simulation tests in which autonomous en-
tities (agents) interact, cooperate, and/or compete to achieve a set of goals. This offers
several advantages: i) the ability to model and implement complex systems formed by
autonomous entities that interact, and capable of pro-active and social behaviour; ii) the
flexibility of MAS applications to add and/or delete computational entities, in order to
achieve new functionalities or behaviours in the system, without altering its overall struc-
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ture; and iii) the ability to use notions such as organization, norms, negotiation, agree-
ment, trust, etc. to implement computational systems that benefit from these human-like
concepts.
On the other hand, in the specific domain of water-right management there is a need
to foster a more rational use of the resource. And it is agreed that this may be addressed
by creating an efficient market of water rights that coexist in a complex, social and legal
framework [Tho97]. Although most water management models are based on equational
descriptions of aggregate supply and demand in a water basin [MdSODO+07], only a few
include an agent-based perspective. Under this perspective, we explore an approach in
which individual and collective agents are essential components because their behaviour,
and effects, may be influenced by regulation and policy-making. The idea is to follow
the thread of MAELIA (http://www.iaai-maelia.eu) and NEGOWAT projects
(http://www.negowat.org) that simulate the socio-environmental impact of norms
for water and how to support negotiations among stakeholders in areas where water con-
flicts arise.
Our approach, as a MAS simulation tool, implements a regulated market environment,
in which different water users (intelligent agents) trade with water rights under different
basin regulations. With such a tool, water-policy makers can easily predict and measure
the suitability and accuracy of new or modified regulations for the overall water market,
i.e. more transfers, fewer conflicts, increased social satisfaction of the water users, etc.,
before applying them into the real floor. At the same time, it is a tool to manage the
water resource in an effective way, both in the short and medium term. All in all, not
only is it an aid for a better understanding of the physical and management aspects of
the water-resource system in question, but it is also a good tool for data organization and
communication among the different teams of the basin administration.
There are a lot of approaches to implement MAS applications. Some approaches are
centered and guided by the agents that will inhabit the systems, while others are guided by
the organizations that the constituent agents may form (for a literature review please refer
to [?]). Apart from these approaches there are another group in which the development
process is centered on the regulations that defines the MAS behavior. We are particu-
larly interested on those methods due to the requirements imposed by the environment of
mWater. In the following section we introduce the Electronic Institution approach used to
develop mWater.
1.2.1 Electronic Institutions
Electronic Institutions (EI) are computational counterparts of conventional institutions
[Nor97, RA01, Est03]. Institutions are, in an abstract way, a set of conventions that artic-
ulate agent interactions [Nor90]. In practice they are identified with the group of agents,
standard practices, policies and guidelines, language, documents and other resources —
the organization— that make those conventions work. Electronic Institutions are imple-
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mentations of those conventions in such a way that autonomous agents may participate,
their interactions are supported by the implementation and the conventions are enforced
by the system on all participants. Electronic institutions are engineered as regulated open
MAS environments. These MAS are open in the sense that the EI does not control the
agents’ decision-making processes and agents may enter and leave the EI at their own
will. EIs are regulated in four ways. First, agents are capable of establishing and fulfill-
ing commitments inside the institution, and those correspond to commitments in the real
world. Second, only interactions that comply with the conventions have any consequence
in the environment. Third, interactions are organized as repetitive activities regulated by
the institution and, last, interactions, in EIs, are always speech acts.
An EI is specified through: (i) a dialogical framework which fixes the context of inter-
action by defining roles and their relationships, a domain ontology and a communication
language; (ii) scenes that establish interaction protocols of the agents playing a given role
in that scene, which illocutions are admissible and under what conditions; (iii) performa-
tive structures that, like the script of a play, express how scenes are interrelated and how
agents playing a given role move from one scene to another, and (iv) rules of behaviour
that regulate how commitments are established and satisfied.
1.3 Our Approach
mWater uses a multi-tier architecture, as depicted in Fig. 1.1. In addition to the three typ-
ical tiers of presentation, business and data persistence, we have a module that represents
the Electronic Institution (EI) for mWater. This way, the construction of mWater consists
of four stages: i) modelling the system as an electronic institution; ii) designing the in-
formation system based on a database of the entire electronic market and basin structure
(persistence tier); iii) implementing the agents (business tier); and iv) deploying the GUI
for simulation tool (presentation tier), which are described next.
1.3.1 Modelling the system as an EI
We have followed the IIIA EI conceptual model [AEN+05], whereas for the actual speci-
fication and implementation we have used the EIDE platform1. The mWater institution is
specified through a nested performative structure with multiple processes, as depicted in
Fig. 1.2 (see Deliverable 8.2.1 for further details). There are five agents’ roles: i) guests,
i.e. users before entering the market; ii) water users, i.e. the guests that have valid water
rights; iii) buyer/seller, thus representing the particular role the water user currently joins
1EIDE is a development environment for Electronic Institutions, implemented at the IIIA
(http://e-institutor.iiia.csic.es/eide/pub). It consists of a set of tools that support
all the stages of EI engineering, namely: i) ISLANDER, a tool for EI specification; ii) aBUILDER, a tool to
support the automatic generation of agent (code) skeletons from ISLANDER specifications; iii) the AMELI
middleware that handles the enactment of the institution; and iv) SIMDEI, a testing and monitoring tool.
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Figure 1.1: Multi-tier architecture of the mWater decision support tool
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for the market; iv) third parties, i.e. those water users that are direct or indirectly affected
by a water transfer —usually conflicting parties; and v) market facilitator and basin au-
thority, thus representing the governing roles of the market. The top structure describes
the overall market environment and includes the following elements:
• Entitlement, which represents the bootstrap routine to give access to the market
to those water-right holders who prove they are entitled to trade because: i) they
have an existing right, or ii) a new right is created by the mWater authorities and an
eligible holder gets it granted.
• Accreditation, which allows legally entitled water-right holders to trade by register-
ing their rights and individual data for management and enforcement purposes.
• TradingHall, which represents a nested performative structure. It basically provides
information about the market and, at the same time, allows users and trading staff
to initiate trading and ancillary operations.
• TradingTables, which represent a nested performative structure and the core of our
market. It allows a market facilitator to open a new trading table whenever a new
auction period starts (i.e. automatically) or whenever a right-holder requests to
trade a right (i.e. on demand). Our implementation accommodates different trad-
ing mechanisms and negotiation protocols, such as Dutch auction, English auction,
standard double auction and blind double auction with mediator negotiation, but
new negotiation protocols can be easily included.
• Agreement Validation, which validates agreements on water-right transfers accord-
ing to the market regulation. More particularly, staff have to check whether the
agreement satisfies formal conditions and the hydrological plan normative conven-
tions.
• Contract Enactment, which represents the signature among parties involved in a
norm-abiding agreement, thus making the agreement active.
• Grievances, which represent a nested performative structure. It allows external
stakeholders to initiate a grievance and conflict resolution procedure that may over-
turn or modify an active agreement. Even if there are no grievances that modify
a contract, parties might not fulfill the contract properly and there might be some
contract reparation actions.
• Annulment, which deals with anomalies that deserve a temporary or permanent
withdrawal of water rights.
The essence of our market relies on the Trading Tables and Grievances structures.
The former implements the trading process itself, which entails the participation of the
buyer/seller and staff agents. Since the agreement execution may eventually turn con-
flicting with third party agents, the grievances structure is necessary to allow normative
conflicts to be solved within the mWater institution.
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Figure 1.2: mWater performative structure. Participating roles: g - guest, w - water user,
b - buyer, s - seller, p - third party, m - market facilitator, ba - basin authority
1.3.2 Storing the Information. Database Design
mWater implements the persistence tier by means of a MySQL database with over 50 re-
lational tables in which historical data is stored (see Fig. 1.3). In essence, we have three
views that comprise the basin, market and grievance structure. In the first view we model
all the information about the nodes, connections, users, norms and water-right defini-
tion. In the second view we model information related to the entire market, including the
trading tables and their protocols, the water rights to be traded, participants, agreements
and contracts that can be signed. Finally, in the third view we model the information
about the legislation and conflicts that may appear after an agreement or contract and the
mechanisms for solving such a conflict, that is the negotiation stage or arbitration proce-
dure. This way, policy makers can run the whole market with real and simulated data for
drought periods, rainfall, norms and users, and analyse how they affect the final results
and the number of grievances. Furthermore, all the changes in the market are registered
in the database to provide statistical information and/or distributions to the policy makers,
which are essential in a decision-support tool.
1.3.3 Implementation of Agents
mWater implements a schema of agents that include both the internal and external roles.
Broadly speaking, there is a JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment Framework, http://jade.tilab.com)
definition for each class that represents the roles in the scenes. The generation of the Java
classes is done in an automated way, thanks to the tools provided by the EIDE devel-
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Figure 1.3: Fragment of the database: basin and market structure
Figure 1.4: Schema of the agents implementation. The mapping proceeds by generating
one Java class per role in each scene it can be involved
opment environment. More particularly, the mapping that is used to generate the agents
implementation is shown in Fig. 1.4. In particular, one Java class is created per valid
role (guest, water user, buyer, seller, third party, market facilitator and basin authority)
and per scene in which each role can participate. Intuitively, this can be seen as a basic
template for an agent participating in a given scene. It is important to note that not all
roles participate in all the scenes —see the definition of the mWater EI in Fig. 1.2—, so
there are roles that are translated into more classes than others. The main idea with this
is to offer open and flexible templates to implement different agents and norms, which
provides more opportunities to the user to evaluate the market indicators under different
regulations and types of agents.
Once the templates have been automatically generated, we can extend them by imple-
menting new classes that represent different behaviours, which is interesting from a sim-
ulation perspective. Basically, we can override methods to change the original behaviour
that allows the agent to move from one state to another, i.e. to execute a transition, or
AT/2008/D8.2.3/v0.1 September 03, 2010 9
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send a message (interact) to other agents. For instance, in the case of the buyer/seller we
have implemented a favourable and unfavourable behaviour. In the former, the agent is
always in favour of achieving an agreement to trade and follow the norms of the mar-
ket, whereas the latter is always against it and does not follow the rules. Note that we
have also two alternatives for norm enforcement [CAB10b]. The former is to implement
this reasoning process in the institution side, making it impossible for an agent to violate
the norms. Although this provides a trustful and safe environment, it is less flexible and
forces the implementation of the agents to be more aware of the legislation of the institu-
tion. Moreover, in real life problems, it may be difficult or even impossible to check norm
compliance, specially when the violation of the norm cannot be directly observable. And
perhaps, it might be preferable to allow agents to violate norms, since they may intend
to improve the organization functionality, despite violating or ignoring norms. On the
contrary, the second alternative moves the norm reasoning process to the agent side, thus
making the system more open and dynamic. In this case, the intelligence of the agent can
make it more or less law-abiding in order to obtain a higher personal benefit. If a norm is
violated and a third party is affected, the grievance mechanism activates and the conflict
resolution stage modelled in the EI is launched.
Additionally, we have currently working on the implementation of more behaviours
that use agreement technologies features. Instead of relying the decisions on a random
basis, we take decisions in terms of trust, cooperation, short-term planning, argumentation
and ethical values. In any case, the advantage here is that we can implement as many
different agents (with different behaviours) as necessary and analyse their impact in the
market.
1.3.4 Simulation Tool
The interface of mWater as a simulation tool is simple and intuitive, as shown in Fig.
1.5. The idea is to offer a straightforward and effective way in which the user configures a
given simulation with the following data: i) the starting and finishing date for the period to
be simulated; ii) the water users that will participate in the market (different groups/type
of water users lead to different results; e.g. a group in which water users do not trust
other members of the group results in a low number of agreements and a high number
of conflicts); and iii) the regulation to be applied in the current simulation. The tool
outputs graphical statistical information that indicates how the market reacts to the input
data in terms of the number of transfer agreements signed in the market (historical data
including information about real or simulated users), volume of water transferred, number
of conflicts generated, etc. Apart from these straightforward parameters, the tool also
shows different quality indicators based on “social” functions in order to asses values
such as the trust and reputation levels of the market, or degree of water user satisfaction,
among others.
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Figure 1.5: The mWater simulator in action.
1.4 Results: the Simulator in Action
Figure 1.5 shows a snapshot of the mWater simulator in action2 . This interface allows the
user, i.e. the water policy maker, to choose different input values that involve simulation
dates, participants, norms (in the form of protocols used during the trading negotiation)
and some decision points that can affect the behavior of the participants3. From the ex-
pertsÕ point of view and evaluation, we can conclude that a model+simulator like this
provides nice advantages: i) it successfully incorporates the model for concepts on water
regulation, water institutions and individual behavior of water users; ii) it formally rep-
resents the multiple interactions between regulations, institutions and individuals; iii) it
puts strong emphasis on user participation in decision making; and iv) it finally provides
a promising tool to evaluate changes in current legislation, and at no cost, which will
surely help to build a more efficient water market with more dynamic norms [CAB10b,
CAB10a, CJBA10, CAJB09, CAB09].
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As  part  of  the  project,  three  application  areas  are  being  used  for  testing  and 
demonstrating the value of this approach: mWater, eProcurement and mHealth. 




proposal,  bidding  and  negotiations,  successful  or  abandoned  agreements, 
complaints and contestation, and arbitration of contested activities. All outcomes 
of  the  individual  activities  are  recorded  in  a  data  base,  which  is  then  used  to 
summarize,  analyze  and  present  the  outcomes.  The  analysis  yields  various 
"measures  of  performance",  that  are  in  fact  multiple  objectives  –  from  the 






The ultimate objective of  the system  is  to provide  information  that  is useful  in 















Most members of  the AB are not expert  in Computer Science  in general and  in 
Agent  Based  methodology  in  particular.  Our  expertise  is  primarily  in  water 
resources  systems,  including  the  use  of  management  models  that  employ 
simulation  and  optimization  methods,  and  we  have  a  range  of  experience  in 
actual management  of  real‐world water  systems. Our  report  should  be  viewed 






Agreements  Technologies  project  sent  information  about  the  work  performed 
(Report and scientific paper) to the Advisory Board.  





During  and  after  the  presentations,  there  were  questions  raised  by  the  AB 
members,  and  discussions  with  the  Project  Team.  And,  finally,  there  was  a 
private meeting of the Advisory Board. 
In  the  private  meeting  of  the  AB,  it  was  agreed  that  a  single  report  will  be 
produced based on individual contributions of the members of the AB. 
This report is designed to present the observations and comments from the AB 




The  system  has  been  modeled  using  the  EIDE  platform  (development 

















the  groups/type  of water  users  that  participate  in  the market;  and  the  norms 
(regulation).  It  also  displays  other  items  such  as  the  "Granularity"  and  the 
"macro  to  be  simulated".  It  gives  as  results  two  "Evaluation metric  variables" 
dealing with Trust and Reputation levels of the market, and Global Benefit. It also 
provides, for the period being simulated, graphs showing time series of Number 






testing  of  mWater  has  been  carried  out.  The  AB  observed  a  demo  of  this 
application and received copies of the power‐point presentations. So far, it seems 
that  the  demonstrator  is  not  yet  dealing  with  the  case  of  study  of  Mancha 
Oriental  aquifer.  It  is  clear  that  the  system  in  its  current  form  is  a  somewhat 
primitive  "robot"  that  seems  to  be making  certain  "moves".  It  is  only  through 
continued  development  and  testing  that  the  system  will  be  able  to  prove  its 
usefulness. In a perspective of several years into the future, what is currently a 
"primitive robot" has the potential of becoming more realistic. 
‐  We  think  that  mWater  can  be  a  good  demonstrator  for  the  Agreement 
Technologies project.  It successfully  incorporates many novel approaches  in an 
innovative way to build a software application which simulates the performance 







‐ We  also  found  the  graphic  user  interface  too  simple:  the  only  outcomes  are 





of  the  Water  Markets  there  is  no  mention  of  economic  functions  that 
express  the  economic  value  of  water  for  the  water  users,  as  these  are 
surely important considerations in the individual decision process to buy 
or sell water rights.. 
‐  The  allegation  (grievance)  activation  process  is  not  sufficiently 
clear: how does a stakeholder discover that he/she is or may be affected 
by an agreement? 
‐  What  arguments  are  allowed  to  support  the  presentation  and 
decision in a Hearing Dispute? 
‐  The results of  the simulation  tool  should be better displayed and 
explained.  A  clear  and  easily  understood  presentation  of  the  results  is 





individuals  are  allowed  to  enter  transactions  under  a  specified  set  of  market 
regulating  norms  and  regulations.  A  most  important  duty  of  the  work  in  the 
project is to ascertain that it is indeed a reasonable depiction of the situation in 
the field, in particular in the Mancha Oriental Aquifer. By this we mean that one 
should be convinced  that  the outcomes generated by mWater are a  reasonable 
outcome, a result that could have happened in the field. It is clear that calibration 
against  past  performance  is  not  possible,  since  there  is  no  body  of  past 
experiences to calibrate against. Still, persons with real experience in this area – 
including  farmers,  farmers'  unions,  local  water  managers,  environmentalists, 
government officials  ‐  should be able  to  say whether  the outcomes of different 
simulations  look  possible,  even  reasonable.  And,  in  addition  to  observing  the 
aggregate  behavior  of  the  market,  individual  behavior  of  a  not‐too‐large  yet 
sufficiently representative set of individual agents should also be examined. This 
is another examination of the reasonableness of the system. 
‐  Moreover,  real  water  markets  tend  to  be  very  imperfect  because  they  are 
strongly constrained by the availability of water infrastructure, which limits the 
possibility  to  store  or  transport  water.  Water  is  not  a  homogeneous  good. 
Different  sources  of  water  have  different  quality  and  value  for  different  user 
types.  
‐ User  and/or  group behavior  is  also  very difficult  to model  because  there  are 
many  factors outside  the modeling scope of mWater which play a role,  such as 
political  influences  (in  Spain  there  can  be  many);  Lobbies,  that  condition 
individual  behavior;  irrational  behavior  (customs,  inertias,  indolence,  etc.); 
effects of Court's appeals and interferences. 
‐  Also,  relationships  between  water  markets  and  other  physical,  and/or 
economical,  and/or  production  factors,  such  as  Hydrology  (rain),    European 
Agricultural  Policies,  Crop  markets  and  prices,  Weather  and  natural  hazards 








From  our  perspective  as  researchers  in  water  management,  we  think  that  a 
number  of  difficulties  need  to  be  overcome  before mWater  could  be  used  for 
practical  purposes.  From  mWater  documentation  and  from  the  presentation 
which was made to the Advisory Board we gather that the mWater represents a 
“virtual world” which corresponds  to an  ideal  formalization of a water market. 
From  this  perspective  it  could  be  used  as  a  software  laboratory  to  carry  out 
virtual experiments to characterize the effect of water polices on water markets.  
 




The  dynamics  of  operation  of  an  actual  market  of  any  kind  is  strongly 
conditioned by  the  quantity  and  the  quality  of  the  available  information.  Both, 
the access to the  information and its associated certainty (and uncertainty) are 
key elements for qualifying a market. Some of the elements of information more 
directly  linked  to  a  water  market  are:  future  availability  of  water  resources, 
profit expectations associated to different crops, eventual maximum or minimum 
price  of  water,  economic  characterization  at  macro  and  micro  scale,  etc.  The 
elements  of  information  that  are  the major  key  factors  for  decision making  of 
farmers,  as main  actors  in  a water  rights  exchange market,  should  be  selected 









situations  of  the  market  conditions  presents  a  high  degree  of  variability  and 
heterogeneity.  The  ideal  behaviour  would  be  one  characterized  by  a  fully 
rational process of decision making based on the available information. Perhaps 
the  variability  observed  in  the  actual  decisions  issued  by  individual  farmers 
could be introduced in the model as a distribution around that ideal behaviour. 
As was sated earlier, as yet there is no sufficient data base of actual cases upon 
which  to  “adjust/fit”  a distribution of  individual  decisions on  selling or buying 
water in the context of a water rights exchange market. There is, however, more 
information regarding observed reactions of farmers faces by similar situations, 
such  as  water  scarcity,  changes  in  expected  produce/crop  prices,  etc.  This 
knowledge  could  suffice  to  characterize  the decisions  that would  resemble  the 
ones that would be issued by farmers in a water market context. The information 
should  be  used  to  test  if  the  model  reacts  in  the  right  direction  in  different 
situations. 
‐  Different  types  of  farmer  individuals  (e.g.:  small  farms,  big  farms),  and  their 
behavior  (e.g.:  influenced only by agricultural production economic arguments, 
or  by  its  overall  economical  circumstances,  including  personal)  should  be 
considered.  Is  there an expert  in behavior analysis  in  the mWater team? If not, 
then a social scientist and/or social psychologist who has good familiarity with 





‐  As  mentioned  above,  persons  with  real  experience  in  this  area  –  including 
farmers,  farmers' unions,  local water managers, environmentalists, government 
officials  ‐  should  be  able  to  say whether  the  outcomes  of  different  simulations 
look  possible,  even  reasonable.  We  recommend  that  presentations  of  such 
results/outcomes  be  made  to  selected  individuals  and  groups.  It  is  suggested 




5.­  About  consideration  of  other  aspects,  e.g.  multiple  objectives,  long­term 
sustainability, physical system operation and behaviour. 
We  refer  here  to  elements  of  the  mWater  system  that  should  be 
added/expanded. 
‐  An  additional  "layer"  should  be  considered  "above"  the  currently  planned 
system,  in  which  the  multi‐objectives  whose  values  are  generated  by  the 
simulation  are  evaluated  for  decision  making.  This  can  be  done  with  multi‐




‐  Long‐term  sustainability  of  the  regional  water  resources  system  should  be 
introduced ‐ as constraints (on amounts being extracted, on groundwater levels, 
on environmental flows into rivers, etc.) and as an objective (e.g., the state of the 
system at  the  end of  the  simulation). Without  these,  there  is  a danger  that  the 





‐  If  the  final  goal  of mWater  is  to  become  eventually  a  computerized  decision 
support tool, further developments would still be required. If the model is to be 




structure  and  model  parameters  have  been  configured  together  by  the  same 
team. These are perceived as a set of graphs depicting interaction among agents 
and a database of basin structure. Which of those features are “persistent” (valid 
for  all  markets)  and  which  are  parameters  (specific  to  Mancha  Oriental 
Aquifer)?. It is claimed that the simulation tool will allow the user to change and 







assess  the  effectiveness  and  quality  of  the  water  market  and  its  influence  on 
improving water resource management.  It  should also provide better access  to 
internal  model  behavior,  which  could  be  used  to  draw  conclusions  regarding 
how to improve the model. 
‐  In  this  first  version,  mWater  has  limited  application  for  decision  support  in 
water  management  problems.  Water  management  is  an  area  with  a  long 
tradition  in using quantitative tools  to support decisions. These tools are being 
continuously  developed  over  time  with  the  main  goal  of  reproducing  the 
behavior of  real  systems under different management actions. To do so, model 
formulation  must  be  carefully  selected  to  incorporate  the  essential  features 
according  to  the objectives of  the modeling effort.  In  addition  to  that,  the user 
must  be  provided with  guidance  on  how  to  set  up  a model  for  a  specific  case 
study and how to analyze its results. All these features are missing in the current 
version of mWater. 
‐  An  effort  should  be made  to  provide  guidance  to  the  user  on  how  to  build  a 
model of a water resources system and to adapt it to a specific case study: how to 







‐  It  was  not  clear  during  the  presentations  whether  some  legitimate  "agents" 
were or were not represented ‐ notably nature and ecology. This was not raised 
at  the meeting,  and  is now posed as a question and a  suggestion  to add  to  the 
agents. 




‐  Even  though  this  is  not  exactly  the  research  and  development  area  of  the 
members of the AB, some of them have had experience in related areas, such as 
decision making  in multiple objective and multiple decision makers framework 
using  game  theory  concepts,  and  applying  them  in  a  participative  process 
fostered  by  the  use  of  a  jointly  developed  Decision  Support  System  (DSS) 
representing  the  real  basin  and  including  the  main  components  (i.e.: 
infrastructure,  water  rights  and  priorities,  operating  rules,  and  water  pricing 
policies),  using  the  results  of  the  DSS  depicting  the  tradeoffs  between  the 
objectives. Both approaches could converge. 
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mWater  introduces a novel  approach  for  software development which opens a 
new  field  in  the  area  of  simulation  of  complex  systems.  Although  there  are 
several examples of water models that incorporate human behavior, especially in 
the  area  of water  demand modeling, mWater  is  an  application  that  focuses  its 
design  on  formal  representation  of  the  multiple  interactions  between 
regulations,  institutions  and  individuals.  Recent  developments  in  public  water 
policy have placed strong emphasis on user participation in decision making, and 
the mWater approach seems a promising one to formalize this process. 
As  a  demonstrator  for  the  Agreement  Technologies  project we  believe  it  is  an 
excellent  application,  with  many  novel  concepts  in  the  area  of  behavioral 
simulation, which opens a new way to develop software applications to assist in 
water  policy  formulation.  It  is  an  adequate  framework  to  simulate  social 
dynamics  of  water  markets.  As  a  first  prototype,  it  requires  further  work, 
specially related to the interface with simulation of the physical system.  
As a virtual  laboratory  for experimentation on water  resources management  it 
has  strong potential, but needs  to be  improved  in a number of ways,  including 
calibration or adaptation to a specific water market and validation with real‐life 
processes. As a tool for decision support in water management, it is still very far 
from  being  useful,  because  no  methodologies  are  being  offered  for  model 
construction,  calibration  or  validation,  and  especially  decision  support 
methodologies. Also, the user interface is still very basic. 
As these are first attempts using MAS and AT approaches, they have to be taken 
as  such,  and  have  reasonable  expectations  on  the  outcomes  of  the  research.  
mWater has to be contemplated as a  first generation platform that can provide 
valuable help  to  raise  and explore questions  related  to water markets  that  are 
now included in the development, but not as a definitive tool able to include and 
give  immediate  answers  to  all  type  of  questions,  like  complex  influences  of 
external physical, economical, and social factors, and/or complex behaviors. 
Therefore,  the  AB  considers  the  Agreement  Technology  project  an  interesting 
and  potentially  useful  research,  and  mWater  a  worthwhile  application.  Our 
observations  and  suggestions  above  are  designed  to  help  in  improving  the 
system itself and its application to a water rights market. 
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